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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040174-CA

vs.
DANIEL PEREZ-AVILA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether Perez-Avila was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel where

trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence and where trial
counsel failed to request merger of driving under the influence as a lesser included
offense of automobile homicide? In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it
is the defendant's burden to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance
in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the
defendant." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f25, 1 P.3d 546 (citations omitted). Where the
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claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the
issue is resolved as a matter of law. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App.), cert
denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (1994).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
All other controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Daniel Perez-Avila appealsfromthe judgment, sentence and commitment of the
Fifth District Court after being convicted on two counts of automobile homicide, second
degree felonies, driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a third degree
felony, two counts of child abuse, class A misdemeanors, and open alcoholic container in
vehicle, a class C misdemeanor.
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B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Daniel Perez-Avila was charged by second amended information filed in the Fifth
Judicial District Court on or about November 12, 2002, with two counts of automobile
homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-207(2)
(2002)1; driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44; two counts of child abuse, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-5-109(3 )(a) and 76-2-103; and
open alcoholic container in vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 41-6-44.20 (R. 31-32).
On November 14, 2002, Perez-Avila was bound over for trial on all counts (R. 3738).
On January 10,2003, Perez-Avila filed a motion to suppress, asserting that
officers obtained incriminating statements from him without proper Miranda warnings
(R. 60-61, 94-97). On March 7,2003, the State filed its opposition to the motion to
suppress (R. 78-91). On June 2, 2003, the trial court denied the motion,findingthat
Perez-Avila was not "in custody" when he was interviewed (R. 105-112).
On October 14,2003, the Statefileda Motion in Limine, requesting that it be
allowed to present evidence that Perez-Avila had been ordered to install an ignition
interlock device in his vehicle, evidence that the device was installed and that PerezAvila circumvented the device's protective features, and evidence of two prior DUI
convictions (R. 139-146).
1

§ 76-5-207(2) is now codified as § 76-5-207(3).
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A jury trial was held on October 20 and 21, 2003 (R. 228, 229). The jury returned
a verdict of guilty on all counts (R. 170-73).
On January 21,2004, Perez-Avila was sentenced to prison based on his
convictions in the following manner: Count I automobile homicide: an indeterminate
term of not less that one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison; Count
II automobile homicide: an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison; and Count III driving under the influence: an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. Counts I and II are
to run consecutive and count III is concurrent. Based on Perez-Avila's other convictions
for Count IV child abuse and Count V child abuse, he was sentenced to a term of one
year in jail for each count, each count to run consecutive (R. 204-06).
On February 4, 2004, Perez-Avila filed pro-se a Notice of Appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals (R. 209).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Testimony of Shaine Dunkle
On Sunday, May 26,2002, Shaine Dunkle had just woken up and was driving his
semi tractor-trailer through Utah on his way to Los Angeles (R. 228: 56, 62). Just south
of Cedar City on Interstate 15, Dunkle drove past a rest area and observed a Nissan
frontier pickup in the rest area backup at a high rate of speed and then take off down the
ramp (R. 228: 57). The Nissan came up behind Dunkle then passed him at a high rate of
speed (R. 228: 57). A mile or two down the road, Dunkle saw the Nissan sitting on the
4

shoulder of the road (R. 228: 57). Dunkle passed the Nissan and then a few miles later
the Nissan pulled beside Dunkle (R. 228: 57). Dunkle saw that a man was driving, a
woman was sitting in the passenger seat, and two children were in the backseat (R. 228:
59). None of the passengers were wearing seat belts and the two children in the back
were standing and playing (R. 228: 61). Dunkle also saw that both the man and the
woman had a can in-between their legs, but he could not tell what they were drinking (R.
228: 71).
The Nissan "was swaying back and forth" on the road (R. 228: 73). A few miles
later, Dunkle then saw the Nissan go off the road on the right side and then the truck
began rolling (R. 228: 58). As the Nissan rolled, Dunkle saw two children being ejected
from the vehicle as well as a "whole lot of cans and stuff goingflyingeverywhere" (R.
228: 58). The other passengers were also ejectedfromthe vehicle (R. 228: 59). Dunkle
called 9-1-1 and went to help the two children that were on the road (R. 228: 60). Both
the little girl and little boy had numerous lacerations and were bleeding badly (R. 228:
60).
Dunkle later saw "a whole lot of beer cans spread all over the place" (R. 228: 60).
He also observed that the Nissan had a couple offlattires, but he could not tell when they
wereflattened(R. 228: 76).
Testimony of Stephanie Robinson
Stephanie Robinson was working at gas station, Travel Centers America, in
Parowan, Utah, on May 26,2002 (R. 228: 85). A Hispanic customer came in, attempting
to pre-pay for gas, but the teller could not understand him due to a language barrier (R.
5

228: 85, 89, 92). Robinson thought he was driving a bronze, small Jeep-like pickup truck
(R. 228: 86, 94). Robinson smelled alcohol on him and when he drove away, she called
the police (R. 228: 86). She told the police the vehicle's license plate number, 720 XXJ,
and informed them he was headed southbound (R. 228: 87, 89). Robinson identified the
customer as the Defendant (R. 228: 90).
Testimony of Deputy Robert Zubal
On May 26, 2002, Robert Zubal was working for the Washington County Sheriffs
Office and was called to a roll-over accident on Interstate 15 (R. 228: 98). Zubal was the
first officer to arrive at the scene (R. 228: 98). He found Perez-Avila next to the truck,
and saw Perez-Avila's wife in a ravine, but she was already deceased (R. 228: 98).
Perez-Avila "appeared to be in very bad shape" (R. 228: 99). Zubal discovered that two
children were also involved in the accident and they were in poor condition with "a lot of
trauma" (R. 228:99).
Zubal noticed the vehicle was a "light, maybe a brown or tan-ish" Nissan pickup
truck and there were no car seats for children (R. 228: 100,101). The seat belts were
fully retracted, meaning they had not been used (R. 228: 100). Zubal also saw five or six
beer cans immediately around the truck; some of them were still full and some had been
opened with a little beer remaining (R. 228: 106-08).
Testimony of Gambrelli Layco
Gambrelli Layco worked for the forensic toxicology lab of the Utah Department of
Health in June of 2002 (R. 228:109). Layco tested samples of what she believed to be
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Perez- Avila's blood and found that the blood alcohol level of the sample was .24 (R. 228:
116, 119).
Testimony of Dr. Edward Leis
Edward Leis is the deputy chief medical examiner for the state of Utah (R. 228:
126). Lies performed an autopsy on the body of Maria Perez Ortez (R. 228: 128). Leis
noted that Mrs. Perez Ortez was 16 weeks pregnant at the time of her death, which was a
result of the car accident (R. 228: 130, 131, 133). Leis also thought the fetus' death
resulted from the death of the mother; however, he did not conduct an autopsy on the
fetus to determine its cause of death (R. 228: 137, 139). Leis only observed the fetus
externally and noted there were no congenital anomalies and no external sings of trauma
(R. 228: 139).
Leis conducted a variety of tests on the body of Perez Ortez and found no drugs or
alcohol present (R. 228: 131). Leis also noted abrasions across Perez Ortez's chest that
denotes she was probably wearing a seat belt (R. 228: 132,143).
Testimony of Kevin Davis
Kevin Davis is employed with the Utah Highway Patrol and was on duty on May
26,2002 (R. 228: 150). Davis arrived at the scene of the accident about 15 minutes after
it occurred and was the investigating officer (R. 228: 151,163). When Davis arrived,
EMT people were already at work (R. 228:164). Davis went to the hospital where the
injured were taken (R. 228: 159). When he arrived at the hospital, Shawn Hinton gave
Davis the kit that allegedly contained Perez-Avila's blood (R. 228: 160).
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Testimony of Sergeant James Lloyd
James Lloyd works for the Utah Highway Patrol and was on duty on May 26,
2002 (R. 228: 176). Lloyd checked some of the seatbelts in the truck and he thought they
were working (R. 228: 181).
The day after the accident, Lloyd went to an impound yard where the truck had
been impounded to search the car in order to determine the identity of the deceased
female (R. 228: 178-79). Lloyd found a diaper bag in the truck and in the diaper bag he
discovered an I.D. card for Maria Cruz Ortez Perez, the deceased (R. 228: 178-79).
Llyod also observed the interlock device (R. 228: 179). The interlock device was
damaged in the accident, and part of it was in the back of the truck and part was in the
front (R. 228: 179). Lloyd, with the help of Dale Kennet, removed the interlock device
from the truck (R. 228: 179).
Testimony of Sergeant Shawn Hinton
Shawn Hinton works for the Utah Highway Patrol and on May 26, 2002, Sergeant
James Lloyd asked him to go to the Dixie Regional Medical Center to "get a blood draw
on the driver" (R. 228: 185-86). Lloyd told Hinton that he thought alcohol may be a
factor in the accident (R. 228: 185). Hinton asked an E.R. nurse, Joanne Nielson, to draw
blood from the driver of the truck (R. 228: 186). Perez-Avila was unconscious when the
nurse drew the blood (R. 228:191). Hinton gave the nurse the standard kit and the nurse
drew the blood from Perez-Avila and then gave the two vials of blood back to Hinton (R.
228: 186-87). The nurse then signed the kit and Hinton later turned the kit over to
Trooper Davis (R. 228:187-88).
8

Testimony of Annette Kennett
In May and June of 2002, Annette Kennett owned Affordable Interlock and
installed an ignition interlock device in Perez-Avila's vehicle (R. 229: 201). The serial
number on the device installed in Perez-Avila's vehicle was S08975 (R. 229: 202).
Kennett explained that the ignition interlock device prevents the vehicle from
starting until the person blows into the sensor unit (R. 229: 204). The sensor unit tests for
ethanol alcohol and if the person does not pass the test, the vehicle will not start (R. 229:
204). The device also has random tests, which the person must blow into while driving
or else the device will beep loudly until the person shuts off the vehicle (R. 228: 206-07).
Kennett also explained that the device records when tests are given and whether
the driver passed the tests (R. 228: 207). Kennett retrieved the memory chipfromthe
ignition interlock device that was in Perez-Avila's vehicle and generated a report
detailing when tests were conducted (R. 228: 207,210). The report stated that on May
26,2002, every test taken on that day was taken and passed (R. 228: 210). The first test
was given in the morning at 9:02 or 9:08, before the vehicle was started (R. 229: 212,
213). The next test was at 9:14, and then two more tests were given randomly and then at
10:16 the engine shut off(R. 229: 213). Then that afternoon, the vehicle was again
driven and a series of tests were given and passed (R. 229: 214).
Kennett testified that the only way to defeat the ignition interlock device was to
either tamper with the wiring or have someone else take the test for the driver (R. 229:
214).
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Testimony of Teresa Barrientez
Teresa Barrientez works for Auto Sense International, and on June 3, 2002, she
examined interlock device S08975A to see if all parts were there and to see if it was
properly functioning (R. 229: 218-19). Barrientez found that the unit was performing
within specifications for a calibrated device and that it had not been tampered with (R.
229: 221). Barrientez also testified that there is no way the device can turn a car off, even
if it malfunctions (R. 229: 224).
Testimony of Joanne Nielson
Joanne Nielson is a registered nurse who works in the emergency room at Dixie
Regional Medical Center (R. 229: 238). Nielson remembered drawing the blood from a
male Hispanic while in the E.R. room #7 (R. 229: 241). Nielson identified Perez-Avila
as the man she drew the blood from and then gave the blood in the kit to Hinton (R. 229:
241-42). Nielson testified that Exhibit 11, a blood kit, contained her initials and the date
and time the blood was drawn (R. 229: 239-40).
Nielson thought that Perez-Avila was awake when she drew his blood, but she did
not ask his consent, saying "I leave that up to the officers9' (R. 229: 243). Nielson also
testified that the typical procedure she follows when drawing blood at the request of law
enforcement is to fill out paperwork and use the kit the officers provide (R. 229: 239).
Nielson made no mention of the officers ever having a search warrant (R. 229: 239).
Testimony of Sergeant Martin Luther III
Martin Luther works for the Salt Lake City police department and was assigned to
visit Perez-Avila at the LDS Hospital in June 2002 (R. 229:259). Luther went to Perez10

Avila's room and then a nurse asked if they wanted a private room to meet in (R. 229:
260). Luther said that would befine,so the nurse escorted them to a private room (R.
229:261).
Luther asked Perez-Avila that he wanted to talk about the crash and if he would
speak with him (R. 229: 261). Perez-Avila consented and Luther recorded the
conversation on a note pad (R. 229: 262). Luther had to refer to his typewritten notes to
recall his interview of Perez-Avila (R. 229: 265).
After a few initial questions lasting at least half an hour, Luther read Perez-Avila
the Miranda warnings and Perez-Avila stated, "I have lost everything. I can't pay for an
attorney so I guess I would ask for an attorney. Are you here to arrest me and take me to
jail? I don't have anything" (R. 229: 270,271). Perez-Avila also stated, "I am so sorry
for what has happened. I have nightmares. I can't remember what happened" (R. 229:
271). Luther responded, "I'm not here to arrest you. I had questions I wanted to ask you
that are related to possible criminal charges so I read you Miranda." (R. 229: 271).
Perez-Avila then stated, "You want to ask if I was drinking?" (R. 229: 272). Luther said,
"That would be one of my questions" (R. 229: 272). Perez-Avila then said,
I had a beer. It takes an hour for an ounce of alcohol to go through my body. The
machine doesn't let me drive if I've had too much. It checks me while I'm
driving. You can get the computer chip out. And it shows when I've tested. I
take it to them to be checked. I am so lonely here I want to see my kids. I want to
help them live. Do you know where my truck is?
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(R. 229: 272). Perez-Avila further told Luther to check the computer chip and then asked
about money he had on the day of the accident, and Luther asked him, "How much
money did you have?" (R. 229: 271). Perez-Avila responded, "I don't know exactly. But
about $1,200. I got a 5,000 dollar loan a few weeks ago. Some money was left, so I told
Maria Sunday, let's go to Palm Springs to see your brother. I don't know what happened.
Maybe I was asleep. I was tired. We stopped. The kids got out to pee. I had a beer. We
stopped a lot. It was a fun time." (R. 229: 273).
Stipulation of Evidence
Both sides stipulated that both children suffered serious physical injury (R. 229: 287).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Perez-Avila asserts that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel
at trial when trial counsel failed to move to suppress the warrantless blood draw evidence
taken in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and for trial counsel failing to request
the driving under the influence of alcohol charge be dismissed as it is a lesser included
offense of automobile homicide.
Perez-Avila's blood was taken without a search warrant and it is clear that there
were no exigent circumstances justifying this warrantless procedure. Thus, Perez-Avila's
Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Had trial counselfileda motion to suppress all
evidence resulting from the illegal blood draw, Perez-Avila would not have been
convicted with two counts of automobile homicide and driving under the influence.
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Also, it is likely that he would not have been convicted with two counts of child abuse as
those convictions hinged upon the automobile homicide convictions.
Driving under the influence is also a lesser included offense of automobile
homicide under the facts of this case, and had trial counsel requested that the DUI charge
merge with automobile homicide, the DUI charge would have merged.
Accordingly, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress
evidence and for failing to request the consolidation of the DUI charge. But for trial
counsels deficient performance, Perez-Avila would have received a more favorable
outcome at trial. Therefore, all charges, except the open container charge, should be
reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE
TO SUPPRESS THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW AND FOR
FAILING TO REQUEST MERGER OF THE DUI AND
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE CHARGES

Perez-Avila asserts that the warrantless blood draw violated his Fourth
Amendment rights because it was unsupported by exigent circumstances and that DUI is
a lesser included offense of Automobile Homicide, thus violating the tenets of Double
Jeopardy. Trial counsel's failure to move to suppress all evidence resultingfromthe
warrantless blood draw and trial counsel's failure to request a merger of the charges
violated his right to effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, all evidence resulting
from the illegal blood draw should be suppressed and the DUI conviction should be
reversed.
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In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden
to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v.
Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ^{25, 1 P.3d 546 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521
(Utah 1994)); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Where the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the
first time on direct appeal, the issue is resolved as a matter of law. State v. Cosey, 873
P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App.), cert denied 883 P.2d 1359 (1994).

A.

There Were No Exigent Circumstances Justifying the Warrantless
Blood Draw.

"Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under both the state and federal
constitutions." State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, % 8, 93 P.3d 854, cert granted 100
P.3d 220 (Utah 2004) (quoting State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190,1192-93 (Utah App.
1991)). "However, the presumption against warrantless searches is not without its
exceptions, which are '"jealously and carefully drawn."' One such exception to the
warrant requirement recognized by both the United States Supreme Court and Utah's
appellate courts is exigent circumstances." Id. (citations omitted).
This Court recently addressed the precise issue of what circumstances justify a
warrantless blood draw after an automobile accident in State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App
198. This Court held:
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"To justify a police officer's decision to extract blood without the benefit of a
search warrant, the State bears the burden of showing that (1) the officer had
probable cause to believe that the defendant was involved in an alcohol-related
offense; (2) the officer had reason to believe the blood sample would produce
evidence of the defendant's level of intoxication when the crime was committed;
(3) the officer reasonably believed that they were 'confronted with an emergency,
in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances,
threatened "the destruction of the evidence,'"; and (4) the method used by the
officer to obtain the blood sample was 'performed in a reasonable manner.'"
Id. at If 9 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1836-37,
16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (citation omitted)). In Rodriguez, the defendant was with a friend
and driving when she abruptly turned left into oncoming traffic, directly in front of a
school bus. Id. at ^ 2. The bus struck the passenger side of the car, throwing the car off
the road and injuring both the defendant and herfriend.Id. The accident occurred
between 4:45 and 4:50 p.m. Id. The accident was immediately reported and the
paramedics arrived on the scene at 4:50 p.m. Id. The defendant was in critical condition
and was quickly transported to LDS Hospital. Id. The passenger had severe head injuries
and the paramedics determined she was near death and likely to die, and she was
transported to the University Hospital. Id.
After the defendant was transported to the hospital, thefirstpolice officers arrived
on the scene. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^ 3. After looking for possible witnesses, a
paramedic informed the officers that the occupants of defendant's car smelled of alcohol.
15

Id. The officers searched the car and discovered a partially empty bottle of vodka in the
passenger's purse. Id. The supervising officer then arrived and was informed of the
events surrounding the accident and immediately requested that dispatch send an officer
to obtain a blood sample from the defendant. Id.
At 5:10 p.m., dispatch instructed Officer Swensen to "witness a blood draw" from
the defendant. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at If 4. Swensen went to the hospital and
found the defendant on a CT table waiting for a CT scan. Id. Swensen noticed that the
defendant was very uncooperative with the medical staff and that "her breath had a heavy
odor of alcohol." Id. Swensen also noticed that the defendant's eyes were red and her
speech was slurred. Id.
Swensen waited twenty-five minutes for the blood technician to arrive and then
Swensen informed the defendant that they "were going to draw blood from her just as we
do in accidents." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at f 5. The technician drew blood from
the defendant's IV line and the blood was labeled, stored, and eventually tested. Id. The
test revealed that the defendant's blood-alcohol level was .39. Id.
The passenger died and the defendant was charged with one count of automobile
homicide. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at % 6. A motion to suppress any evidence
derived from the warrantless blood draw was filed, but the trial court denied the motion.
Id. The defendant was subsequently convicted of automobile homicide. Id.
On appeal, the defendant asserted that the State failed to demonstrate that the
warrantless blood draw was justified by exigent circumstances. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App
198, at f 10. The State asserted that the "U.S. Supreme Court and a majority of
16

jurisdictions have considered the issue and held that the evanescence of blood-alcohol
evidence coupled with delays inherent in investigating an alcohol-related traffic accident
constitutes exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment." Id. This Court
recognized that some jurisdictions have interpreted Schmerber to create a per se rule, but
this Court conclusively held that "the Schmerber language comports with accepted
exigent circumstances doctrine" and this Court declined to adopt the per se rule
advocated by the State. Id. This Court then held that "exigent circumstances will be
found where the situation involves blood-alcohol evidence, only when the 'totality of the
circumstances/ supports a finding that the officer 'was confronted with an emergency, in
which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the
destruction of evidence.'" Id. at ^ 14 (citations omitted).
Under the totality of the circumstances test, this Court highlighted several factors
that should be considered in "determining whether a situation created exigent
circumstances sufficient to overcome the need for a search warrant." Rodriguez, 2004 UT
App 198 at \ 16. The factors "include the distance to the nearest magistrate, the
availability of a telephonic warrant, the feasibility of a stake-out while a warrant is being
obtained, the seriousness of the underlying alcohol-related offense, the commission of
another offense such asfleeingthe scene, the ongoing and continuing nature of an
investigation, the extent of probable cause, and the conduct of the investigating officers."
Id.
This Court observed that the decision to extract defendant's blood without a
warrant was made twenty-five minutes after the accident occurred and at a time "'when
17

courts are open and search warrants can be readily requested' either in person or by
telephone." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^ 19 (citation omitted). Moreover, there was
no attempt by any officer to obtain a warrant, nor did the State present evidence that
anyone "assessed the difficulty and time required to obtain a proper search warrant." Id.
Instead, "both officers seemingly proceeded with the understanding that a warrant was
not necessary to extract [defendant's] blood." Id.
This Court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of proving exigency,
and further highlighted its disapproval of routine warrantless blood draws by
emphasizing that "exigency is the opposite of routine, and a reasonable belief that an
emergency is at hand is always required if warrantless action is to be justified on the basis
of exigent circumstances." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^ 20.
Perez-Avila asserts that the facts in the present case are strikingly similar to
Rodriguez. Both Perez-Avila and Rodriguez were involved in a car accident which
resulted in the death of one of the passengers (R. 228: 98). Both were subjected to
warrantless blood-draws within a short time after the accidents (R. 228: 185-86). And
just like Rodriguez, where the State presented no evidence that the officers had requested
a warrant to draw the blood, there is no evidence that the officers in this case attempted to
obtain a proper warrant to draw Perez-Avila's blood, or that the officers even
contemplated the necessity of obtaining a warrant (R. 228:185-86). In fact, it appears
from the record that the officers in the present case, just like the officers in Rodriguez,
assumed that a warrant was unnecessary to draw Perez-Avila's blood (R. 228:185-86;
229:239).
18

The State could not have met its burden of showing exigent circumstances
sufficient to overcome the need for a warrant. There is no evidence of the officers
attempting to obtain a warrant from a nearby magistrate or even to obtain a telephonic
warrant. There is no evidence that Perez-Avila was attempting to flee the scene. See
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^f 16. In fact, Perez-Avila was severely injured and
unconscious at the hospital (R. 228: 99; 191). Moreover, while there is no specific
timeline mentioned in the record regarding the time of the blood draw and when the
decision to draw the blood was made, it appearsfromthe record that the decision to take
Perez-Avila's blood was made shortly after the accident occurred (R. 228: 185-86).
Under these circumstances, the State could not show that the evidence would be
destroyed before a warrant could be obtained. There was simply no showing of exigent
circumstances overcoming the need for a warrant.
Had trial counsel moved to suppress evidence of the warrantless blood draw, the
trial court would have granted the motion because, for reasons stated above, the State
could not have met its burden of establishing exigent circumstances sufficient to
overcome the need for a warrant. Had the blood alcohol evidence been suppressed, it is
likely that Perez-Avila would not have been convicted of any of the charges, except for
the open container charge. The State's only sure evidence that Perez-Avila operated a
vehicle while driving under the influence derived from the illegal blood draw. Without
that evidence, the State could not have proven the elements of DUI or automobile
homicide. It is also likely that the State could not have proven the two charges of child
abuse since that verdict rested on the juryfindingPerez-Avila acting with criminal
19

negligence (R. 186). If the State could not prove that Perez- Avila was operating a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, then it is likely it could not prove he acted
with criminal negligence.
Because the warrantless blood draw in this case was conducted in violation of
Perez-Avila's right to be free from such searches and seizures, the exclusionary rule
should bar the admission of all evidence arising from the warrantless draw of PerezAvila's blood. It follows that trial counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment and that this deficient performance
prejudiced Perez-Avila since he would have likely only been convicted of a class C
misdemeanor open container violation.

B.

DUI is a Lesser Included Offense of Automobile Homicide.

Perez-Avila asserts that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
and subjected him to unconstitutional double jeopardy by failing to argue driving under
the influence was a lesser-included offense of automobile homicide. Accordingly, this
Court should reverse his conviction for driving under the influence because it merges
with automobile homicide under the facts of this case.
The merger doctrine has been codified at Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402(3) and
provides:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An
offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged; or
20

(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation
to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
"The prohibition on conviction for lesser-included offenses flows from the double
jeopardy clauses of the Utah and the United States Constitutions." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d
236,241 (Utah App.1997); see also Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 ("[N]or shall any person be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."); U.S. Const. Amend. V ("[Njor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.").
"Thus, we interpret section 76-1-402(3) to comply with the underlying constitutional
guarantees against double jeopardy." Id. "Utah courts apply a two-tiered analysis to
identify lesser-included offenses. First we determine whether the lesser offense is
'established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged.' If the two crimes are 'such that the greater cannot
be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser/ then the lesser offense
merges into the greater crime and the State cannot convict and punish the defendant for
both offenses." Id. (citing State v. Hill, 61A P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983).
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-207(2) and 41-6-44 demands that
driving under the influence is a lesser-included offense of automobile homicide under the
facts of this case. A person is guilty of automobile homicide if he "operates a motor
vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing the death of another and ... has a blood
or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation." Utah
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Code Ann. § 76-5-207(3)(a)2. A person is guilty of driving under the influence if he
operates or is in "actual physical control of a vehicle ... [and] has sufficient alcohol in the
person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath
alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test." Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44(2)(a)3.
On the facts of this case, for Perez-Avila to be convicted of automobile homicide,
the jury had to find that he "operated a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner/9
"which caused the death of another human being/' and that he "had sufficient alcohol in
his body that a subsequent chemical test showed that he had a blood alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test" or "at the time of operation
of the vehicle" (R. 182). And for Perez-Avila to be convicted of driving under the
influence, the jury had to find that he "operated or was in actual physical control of a
vehicle" and "had a blood alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater" (R. 185). Once
the jury found that Perez-Avila was guilty of automobile homicide, it could not avoid
finding that he was driving under the influence since automobile homicide cannot be
committed without committing driving under the influence. Accordingly, Utah Code
Annotated § 76-1-402(3) provides that Perez-Avila cannot be convicted of both
automobile homicide and driving under the influence of alcohol since the driving under
2

§ 76-5-207(2) (2002) is now codified at § 76-5-207(3).
Although Perez-Avila was convicted of third-degree felony DUI, the trial court, not the jury,
considered the prior offenses enhancing the DUI to a third-degree felony (R. 153,185). PerezAvila asserts that the third-degree felony DUI charge is only an enhancement penalty, not an
element of the underlying offense and that under the facts of this case, DUI is a lesser included
offense of automobile homicide. See State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah App. 1996)
(whether or not a charge is a second or subsequent violation is not a substantive element of the
charged crime, but is rather a sentencing enhancement).

3
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the influence charge was "established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission o f automobile homicide.
This Court has previously held that when trial counsel fails to request
consolidation of charges under the merger doctrine where the law supports that
conclusion, he or she has failed to provide effective assistance. Ross, 951 P.2d at 246; see
also State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 645-46 (Utah 1996). In Ross, defendant's trial
counsel failed to request consolidation of third-degree forgery with second-degree
communications fraud. Id. at 238. This Court observed that "[kjnowledge of the law is a
basic prerequisite to providing competent legal assistance. If an attorney does not
investigate clearly relevant law, then he or she has objectively failed to provide effective
assistance." Id. at 246. After concluding that third-degree forgery is a lesser included
offense of second-degree communications fraud, this Court noted that "a reasonable
investigation would have alerted counsel that his client might be facing double jeopardy"
and summarily found that defendant's trial "counsel's assistance fell below an objective
standard of professional competence." Id.
Following the reasoning set forth in Ross, where trial counsel's performance was
deemed ineffective for failing to request consolidation of charges, it is clear that PerezAvila's trial counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to request the DUI
charge merge with automobile homicide. But for trial counsel's deficient performance,
Perez-Avila would not have been convicted of driving under the influence. Therefore,
his conviction for driving under the influence should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Perez-Avila asks this Court to reverse his convictions
for automobile homicide, second degree felonies, driving under the influence, a third
degree felony, and child abuse, class A misdemeanors.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of December, 2004.

Margaret P.
Counsel for Appellant
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ADDENDA

797

(i) more than one prior violation within the previous ten years of any offense which, if the defendant
were convicted, would qualify as a "conviction" as
defined under Subsection 41-6-44(1);
(ii) a felony violation of Section 41-6-44; or
(lii) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207.
(2) A verification under Subsection (l)(c) may be made by:
(a) a written indication on the citation;
(b) a separate written document; or
(c) any other means which the court finds adequate to
record the law enforcement agency's verification.
(3) (a) Prior to agreeing to a plea of guilty or no contest or
to filing an information under Subsection (1), the prosecutor shall examine the criminal history or driver license
record of the defendant.
(b) If the defendant's record contains a conviction or
unresolved arrest or charge for an offense listed in Subsections (l)(c)(i) through (iii), a plea may only be accepted
if:
(i) approved by:
(A) a district attorney;
(B) a deputy district attorney;
(C) a county attorney;
(D) a deputy county attorney;
(E) the attorney general; or
(F) an assistant attorney general; and
(ii) the "attorney giving approval under Subsection
(3)(b)(i) has felony jurisdiction over the case.
(4) A plea of guilty or no contest is not made invalid by the
failure of the court, prosecutor, or law enforcement agency to
comply with this section.
2004
41-6-43.10. Repealed.

41-6-44

MOTOR VEHICLES

1986

41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs,
or a combination of both or with specified or
unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment —Arrest without warrant —
Penalties — Suspension or revocation of license.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "assessment" means an in-depth clinical interview
with a licensed mental health therapist:
(i) used to determine if a person is in need of:
(A) substance abuse treatment that is obtained at a substance abuse program;
(B) an educational series; or
(C) a combination of Subsections (l)(a)(i)(A)
and (B); and
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section
62A-15-105.
(b) (i) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation
of:
(A) this section;
(B) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of
both-related reckless driving under Subsections
(9) and (10);
(C) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled substance that is taken illegally in the body;
(D) local ordinances similar to this section or
alcohol, any drug, or a combination of bothrelated reckless driving adopted in compliance
with Section 41-6-43;
(E) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-

(G) a violation described in Subsections
(l)(b)(i)(A) through (F), which judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or
(H) statutes or ordinances in effect in any
other state, the United States, or any district,
possession, or territory of the Umted States
which would constitute a violation of this section
or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of bothrelated reckless driving if committed in this
state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S C. Sec. 815;
(ii) A plea of guilty or no contest to a violation
described in Subsections (l)(b)(i)(A) through (H)
which plea is held in abeyance under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a
conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently
reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in
abeyance agreement, for purposes of:
(A) enhancement of penalties under:
(I) this Chapter 6, Article 5, Driving
While Intoxicated and Reckless Driving, and
(II) automobile homicide under Section
76-5-207, and
(B) expungement under Section 77-18-12.
(c) "educational series'' means an educational series
obtained at a substance abuse program that is approved
by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in
accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(d) "screening" means a preliminary appraisal of a
person:
(i) used to determine if the person is in need of:
(A) an assessment; or
(B) an educational series; and
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section
62A-15-105;
(e) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that
creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death;
(f) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance abuse program that is approved by
the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in
accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(g) "substance abuse treatment program" means a
state licensed substance abuse program;
(h) a violation of this section includes a violation under
a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and
(i) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an
ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under
like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state if the person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a
subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a
blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater at the time, of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a
degree that renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle; or
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
.08 grams or greater at the time of operation or actual
physical control;
(iv) (A) is 21 years
of4- age
or older;
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MOTOR VEHICLES

person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .05 grams or greater at the time of the
test;
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in
the vehicle at the time of operation or actual
physical control, and
(D) committed the offense within ten years of
a prior conviction; or
(v) (A) is 21 years of age or older;
(B) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration
of .05 grams or greater at the time of operation or
actual physical control;
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in
the vehicle at the time of operation or actual
physical control; and
(D) committed the offense within ten years of
a prior conviction.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a
drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this
section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based
upon grams of alcohol per 100 milhHters of blood, and
alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon
grams of alcohol per 210 hters of breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a
violation of Subsections (2)(a)(i) through (iii) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated
the vehicle in a negligent manner;
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in
the vehicle at the time of the offense; or
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a
passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle at
the time of the offense.
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is
guilty of a third degree felony if the person has also
inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent
manner.
(c) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection
(2)(a)(iv) or (v) is guilty of:
(i) a class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) a class A misdemeanor if the person has also
inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent
manner.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall,
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence
of not less than 48 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a
jail sentence, require the person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program
for not less than 48 hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the
use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home confinement, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in a screening;
(ii) order the person to participate in an assessment, if it is found appropriate by a screening under
Subsection (4)(c)(i);
(iii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does not order substance
abuse treatment as described under Subsection
(4)(d); and
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(iv) impose a fine of not less than $700.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substan
abuse treatment if the substance abuse treatment TJ
gram determines that substance abuse treatment is fl
propnate.
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii) tl
court may order probation for the person in a'C(,0
dance with Subsection (14)
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the perse
had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, the con
shall order probation for the person in accordant
with Subsection (14).
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) wit^
ten years of a prior conviction under this section, the con
shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory j a
sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of
jail sentence, require the person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work progra]
for not less than 240 hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through tl
use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Sul
section (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-se
vice work program, or home confinement, the court shal
(l) order the person to participate in a screening
(ii) order the person to participate in an assess
ment, if it is found appropriate by a screening unde
Subsection (5)(c)(i);
(iii) order the person to participate in an educ*
tional series if the court does not order substanc
abuse treatment as described under Subsectio
(5)(d); and
(iv) impose a fine of not less than $800.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substanc
abuse treatment if the substance abuse treatment pre
gram determines that substance abuse treatment is af
propriate.
(e) The court shall order probation for the person i
accordance with Subsection (14).
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is
third degree felony if it is:
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under thi
section within ten years of two or more prior conw
tions; or
(ii) at any time after a conviction of:
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5
207 that is committed after July 1, 2001; or
(B) a felony violation under this section that i
committed after July 1, 2001.
(b) Any convict Lon described in this Subsection (6
which judgment of conviction is reduced under Sectioi
76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of this section.
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court sus
pends the execution of a prison sentence and places th<
defendant on probation the court shall impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1>50*
hours.
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impost
an order requiring the person to obtain a screening an<
assessment and substance abuse treatment at a sub
stance abuse treatment program providing intensive can
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervise*
follow-through after treatment for not less than 24(
hours.
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsec
tion (6)(c), if the court orders probation, the probatioi
shall be supervised probation which may include requtf
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the evidence, it shall return a verdict on the reduced
charge as provided in Subsection (4)(b).
(b) If under Subsection (4)(a) the offense is:
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead
be found guilty of murder;
(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant
shall instead be found guilty of attempted murder;
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found
guilty of manslaughter; or
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead
be found guilty of attempted manslaughter.
(5) (a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the
jury is required to establish the existence of the special
mitigation.
(b) If the jury does find special mitigation by a unanimous vote, it shall return a verdict on the reduced charge
as provided in Subsection (4).
(c) If the jury finds by a unanimous vote that special
mitigation has not been estabhshed, it shall convict the
defendant of the greater offense for which the prosecution
has established all the elements beyond a reasonable
doubt.
(d) If the jury is unable to unanimously agree whether
or not special mitigation has been estabhshed, the result
is a hung jury.
(6) (a) If the issue of special mitigation is submitted to the
trier of fact, it shall return a special verdict indicating
whether the existence of special mitigation has been
found.
(b) The trier of fact shall return the special verdict at
the same time as the general verdict, to indicate the basis
for its general verdict.
(7) Special mitigation under this section does not, in any
case, reduce the level of an offense by more than one degree
from that offense, the elements of which the evidence has
estabhshed beyond a reasonable doubt.
1999
76-5-206. Negligent homicide.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the
actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of
another.
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.
1973
76-5-207. Automobile homicide.
U) As used in this section, "motor vehicle" means any
self-propelled vehicle and includes any automobile, truck, van,
Motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft.
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third
degree felony, if the person operates a motor vehicle in a
ne
gligent manner causing the death of another and:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood
or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater at the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a
degree that renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle; or
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
-08 grams or greater at the time of operation.
(D) A conviction for a violation of this Subsection (2) is
second degree felony if it is subsequent to a conviction as
ae
fined in Subsection 41-6-44(1).
te) As used in this Subsection (2), "negligent" means
pie negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of
**e that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under
(3\Te o r similar circumstances.
ta) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second
S^e felony, if the person operates a motor vehicle in a

76-5-301

criminally negligent manner causing the death of another
and:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood
or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater at the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a
degree that renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle; or
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
.08 grams or greater at the time of operation,
(b) As used in this Subsection (3), "criminally negligent" means criminal negligence as defined by Subsection
76-2-103(4).
(4) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided
by Section 41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of
chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6-44.5 apply to
determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this
section.
(5) Calculations of blood or breath alcohol concentration
under this section shall be made in accordance with Subsection 41-6-44(2).
(6) The fact that a person charged with violating this
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug
is not a defense.
(7) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by
Rules of Evidence or the constitution.
2004
76-5-208. Child abuse homicide.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes child abuse homicide if
the actor causes the death of a person under 18 years of age
and the death results from child abuse, as defined in Subsection 76-5-109(1):
(a) if done recklessly as provided in Subsection 76-5109(2)(b);
(b) if done with criminal negligence as provided in
Subsection 76-5-109(2)(c); or
(c) if done with the mental culpability as provided in
Subsection 76-5-109(3)(a), (b), or (c).
(2) Child abuse homicide as described in Subsection (l)(a) is
a second degree felony.
(3) Child abuse homicide as described in Subsections (l)(b)
and (c) is a third degree felony.
2000
76-5-209. Homicide by assault — Penalty.
(1) A person commits homicide by assault if, under circum
stances not amounting to aggravated murder, murT
manslaughter, a person causes the deathj)£
intentionally or knowingly attempting,
violence, to do bodily injury to ***
(2) Homicide by assa^1' "
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